The Official Inquiry of the sinking of the Rangitane

Report of Commission of Inquiry on the Loss of Certain Vessels by Enemy Action and Alleged Leakage of Information

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNER-GENERAL OF THE DOMINIAN OF NEW ZEALAND

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY:

The terms of the Commission issued to us and dated the 30^th day of January, 1941, laid upon us the duty of inquiring into and reporting on the following matters:

(a) The circumstances surrounding the loss of the steamship Holmwood, the motor-vessel Rangitane, the motor-vessel Vinni, and the steamship Komata :

(b) The question whether there have been any leakages, either directly or indirectly, from New Zealand of information relating to the movements of ships; and, if so, the facts, relating to such leakages.

We entered upon this inquiry on the 4th day of February, 1941, at Wellington. The relevant regulations empowered us to determine that, in whole or in part, the proceedings should be in camera. It was from the first obvious that it would be necessary to make a thorough inquiry into topics which could not possibly be discussed in public, for the reason that to do so would facilitate the publication to the enemy of matters which must be kept concealed from the enemy. After consideration, we were forced to the conclusion that it would be impossible to determine in advance as to any particular witness, or as to any particular topic, that matter which ought to be kept secret might not unexpectedly emerge. For this reason we came to the conclusion that the whole proceedings must be in camera, and to that decision we have adhered throughout.

It was obvious from the first that a topic into which inquiry would have to be made was how it came about that the Holmwood failed to make use of the wireless apparatus with which it was fitted. This having been intimated to Captain Miller, the master of the vessel, he expressed a desire to be represented by counsel, Mr. Kirkcaldie. Mr. Kirkcaldie was permitted by us attend the portions of the inquiry which were concerned with this topic, so far as those portions could be foreseen. There was also made available to him the record of all evidence which touched this topic. He was allowed to cross-examine such witnesses as he expressed a desire to cross-examine, and he was allowed to make submissions on behalf of his client.

The Solicitor-General and Dr. Fodon, of the Crown Law Office, attended the inquiry for the purpose of assisting the Commission by assembling and presenting the evidence. It is, however, desirable to make clear that the Commission itself determined the topics upon which it wished to hear evidence and, in many instances, the witnesses whom it wished to hear. The functions performed by the Solicitor-General and Dr. Foden were to assist by getting before the Commission what the Commission itself regarded as necessary evidence. If the record of evidence is looked at, it will beobserved, we think, that throughout the lengthy inquiry witnesses were not questioned merely by the Solicitor-General and Dr. Fodon, but that the members of the Commission themselves asked a great many of the questions. The Solicitor-General made some opening explanatory remarks while the Commission was still in public session. Towards the end of the inquiry he asked us whether it was our wish that he should make any attempt at summation of the evidence at the conclusion of the inquiry. We came to the conclusion, and intimated to him, that we did not consider this would fall within his function. His function, as we see it, was simply to assemble for our convenience and present the evidence which we desired to hear. He had not the function of counsel representing any party whatever, and therefore had no duty to assist us to determine what were the proper conclusions to draw from the evidence. Therefore the only address or speech from any counsel which has been heard since the Commission went into camera was the speech from Mr. Kirkcaldie on behalf of his client, Captain Miller.

There were put at our disposal, and we carefully examined, the whole of the very numerous written statements made and signed by survivors from the captured ships after they reached New Zealand. The regulations governing our procedure gave us power to accept, for what we considered it worth, evidence which is not strictly legal evidence and would not be acceptable in an ordinary Court. When, as has sometimes happened, the actual attendance of a survivor before us has proved impossible, and his or her written statement has contained relevant matter we have therefore thought it our duty to consider it, and to give it such weight as seems just. But wherever the perusal of a statement of a survivor has suggested to us that more light on matters might be obtained by procuring the personal attendance of the survivor, then, whenever this has been at all possible, it has been done. In the result, we have actually had before us 34 survivors. There were also before us 59 other witnesses. Those other witnesses were persons from whom it was desirable to hear because in one way or another they could give evidence relevant to the topics before the Commission. For example, senior officers of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force have testified to matters within their particular scope and knowledge. Senior officers of the Police, the Post and Telegraph Department, the Censorship Department, the Government Railways, the External Marketing Department, and the Broadcasting Services have been amongst such witnesses. In short, wherever our own knowledge or communications from members of the public have suggested to us that what is done or neglected in any particular matter might lead to the enemy possessing information about the movements of shipping, we have used our powers to discover, by sworn evidence, what precisely is happening as to such matters.

In response to notifications which we caused to be made in the press, a very considerable number of private citizens have sent us in writing a great variety of suggestions and have proffered a great variety of information. Every such communication has been carefully considered by the Commission. Where, as has sometimes been the case, the communication makes allegations against persons suspected by the correspondent, the communication has been referred to the police for the necessary inquiry and appropriate action. Many of the communications from the public referred to general matters, and some of them contained very valuable suggestions. Naturally, it has often happened that several correspondents have directed our attention to the same point, but all the suggestions have been considered, and, wherever it has happened that they have opened up to us a new line of inquiry, such inquiry as we have thought proper in the particular case has been made.

The circumstances surrounding the loss of the steamship Holmwood constitute the first topic into which it has been our duty to inquire, and upon which we now have the duty of reporting.

The Holmwood, a small steamer of 247 tons net, left Waitangi, in the Chatham Islands, at 2.30 a.m. on the morning of Monday, the 25th November, 1940, bound for Lyttelton. Her cargo included live sheep. At 8 a.m. that morning she was overtaken and stopped by three German raiders. Of these, the ship known as the Manyo Maru made the closest approach to the Holmwood and actually stopped her. This ship showed Japanese colours until she was quite close. What colours, if any, the other ships showed does not appear to have been observed, and may not have been observable. At all material times the other two ships were substantially farther from the Holmwood than was the Manyo Maru. From the bridge of the Holmwood the horizon is a distance of 5.5 miles. Except for some summer haze, the weather conditions were favourable to visibility, and on that morning the horizon could be seen in all directions. It follows that each of these three ships must have been visible when it was substantially more than 5.5 miles from the Holmwood and must have been visibly overtaking the Holmwood for a considerable time before the Holmwood was stopped at 8 a.m. The Holmwood had wireless, but made no attempt to use it.

The evidence does not, in our opinion, warrant any definite conclusion as to whether any raider fired any shot. At page 30 of his evidence Captain Miller says, " I heard what I thought was the report of a gun. I had no definite information of that." There is some suggestion that the Second Officer, Mr. Clarkc, saw what he thought might be a splash of water made by a falling projectile (Evidence, p. 764). No other person on the Holmwood seems to have heard or seen anything which suggested to him that the raiders fired. But there is evidence from two of the crew, Waterhouse and Stiles, that, after the capture, the Germans told Captain Miller that they had fired two warning shots from a gun of small calibre, but that Captain Miller said he had heard no shots.

It is clearly established that, after the capture, the Germans claimed that they had been waiting for the Holmwood, that their meeting with her was designed and not accidental, and that their purpose was to obtain a supply of fresh meat, which, in fact, was obtained. It is also clear that they claimed to have intercepted certain wireless messages as to the Holmwood which had passed between the Chatham Islands and the mainland and that they manifested an accurate knowledge of the contents of some of these messages. This, however, does not finally establish that the capture of the Holmwood was designed. Mr. McMahon, the Chatham Islands Postmaster and Wireless Operator, who was returning to the mainland on the Holmwood, says that records of all wireless messages which had passed between the Chathams and Wellington from the 8th to 23rd November were on board the Holmwood as part of the mail (see annexure to his evidence at p. 558.) His theory is that the Germans acquired their knowledge of the contents of these messages from a perusal of the captured mail, that their claim to have actually intercepted wireless messages is false and that, contrary to what the Germans asserted, their meeting with the Holmwood was purely fortuitous. While, upon the evidence, it is impossible to reject Mr. McMahon's theories, in our opinion, the probabilities are against them. This much, however, is plain, and, in our opinion, should be recorded :-

A number of radio messages passed between New Zealand and the Chathams in clear uncoded language which, if they were intercepted, must have assisted the enemy to knowledge of the intended movements of the Holmwood. The practice, both in New Zealand and at the Chathams, appears to have been to code messages which actually mentioned a ship's name or a sailing date, but to send in clear language other messages from which fairly accurate knowledge of an intended sailing date could be inferred. As to these matters, we refer to the evidence at pp. 180-187, 389-39;
The master of the Holmwood and the Lyttelton agent of the owners used a private code word "Confirming" which meant "Have arrived." This was a dangerous practice and was contrary to the regulations;
Some time before the final voyage of the Holmwood some unrecorded conversation in Morse took place by wireless between Mr. McMahon and a wireless operator in New Zealand relative to the furniture of the officer who was shortly to relieve McMahon. This unrecorded conversation may have included some reference to probable future sailing dates. This matter is mentioned in the evidence at pp. 391-395. In our opinion, any use of wireless in wartime of which no full official record is kept is dangerous, and stringent precautions should be taken that nothing of this kind recurs. There is no ground for thinking that this particular conversation aided the raiders, but we are concerned to condemn the occurrence as one which should not have happened, and should not happen again;
The nature of the then recent wireless messages to and from the Chathams was investigated by the Naval authorities after, and in consequence of the loss of the Holmwood; and, on 9th January, 1941, consequent upon representations made by them, it was decided that in future all wireless messages to and from the Chathams be in code. In our opinion, the continuance of this precaution during wartime is absolutely necessary, and there should be no relaxation of it or exception to it during the duration of the war;
The fact that the Germans questioned Captain Miller and McMahon as to the meaning of a coded message from the Chathams on 25th November appears to settle that the code in use at the time of the loss of the Holmwood, where code was used at all, had not then been compromised:
But if it is the practice to send the text of all wireless messages back to New Zealand by regular mail-service, and if this record gives the clear language of messages sent in code, we think such a practice dangerous and undesirable. If a raider captures the clear language of messages he had already intercepted in code, he may be provided with the key to the code.

In any event, and as a further precautionary measure, all codes used should be changed from time to time.

The next matter in connection with the capture of the Holmwood which requires discussion is the fact that no attempt was made to use the wireless apparatus which the vessel was required to carry, and, in fact, carried.

In common with other master mariners, Captain Miller had received a series of Admiralty instructions as to the sending of wireless message relative to suspicious ships. This appears from Captain Miller's evidence at p. 31. The text of the instructions is annexed to this report and is marked "A." In our opinion, these instructions make it clear to any one who reads them that the primary purpose of the message is not the preservation or rescue of the ship which sends the message, but the prompt discovery and destruction of the raider, that this primary purpose should be pursued even it the expense of the ship to which falls the opportunity of sending the message, that there is a duty to be vigilant in the discovery of other ships, and to be prompt in entertaining suspicion, and that as soon as there is any ground for suspicion, the sending of the wireless message should be attempted regardless of the consequences to the ship which sends or attempts the message. The evidence, in our opinion, establishes :

That the Holmwood stopped at 8 a.m., by which time the nearest raider was not more than 1 mile away ;
that, having regard to the weather conditions and consequent visibility, this raider should have been seen from the Holmwood's bridge when it was 10 miles from the Holmwood.

The next question is what is the least period of time that could have elapsed between the moment at which this raider first became visible and the stopping of the Holmwood at 8 a.m. This question may be approached in two ways- viz., by estimating the respective speeds of the two vessels, or by considering the actual evidence as to what time elapsed. Captain Miller gives the speed of the Holmwood at 8.5 knots. Upon the evidence and the probabilities, we are not prepared to believe that the raider could exceed this by more than 12 knots. It results that at least forty-five minutes would elapse before the raider could reduce a distance of 10 miles to a distance of 1 mile; and this would be the position if she came up dead astern. According to the evidence she did not. This minimum of forty-five minutes, arrived at in this way, is confirmed by the evidence of witnesses as to what time actually elapsed. The evidence of Captain Miller, of Mr. Clarke, the Second Officer, of Mr. Abernethy, the First Engineer, and of McLeod (the helmsman) conflict in many respects. But all agree that the ship stopped at 8 a.m., and that the leading raider was or must have become visible by 7.15 a.m. or earlier.

In our opinion, this minimum period of forty-five minutes which must have elapsed was more than sufficient for discovering the vessel, for suspecting the vessel, and for sending a wireless message. As the time required for the actual sending of the message, Captain Miller says (p. 36) that as a matter of routine he had a message ready coded up and ready to be sent at short notice in case of emergency, and (p. 33) he estimated three or four minutes as the minimum period in which he could have sent it.

The watch of the Second Officer, Mr. Clarke, was from 4 a.m. to 8 a.m. His therefore was the responsibility of discovering the presence of the first raider which became visible. We believe he was, in fact, the first person on the Holmwood to see the raider. But it is clear from his own evidence (pp. 979, 980) that he was then not on the bridge, but towards the stern of the ship, where he had been feeding a horse. He says the time was then 7 a.m. or even earlier. We think the time was later, though this may be an honest mistake on his part. He says what he then saw was the smoke of a vessel not yet over the horizon. There are other circumstances in the evidence which cast doubt on this, and suggest that when he first saw the ship, she herself, and not merely her smoke, may have been partly visible over the horizon. It also appears from the evidence that for about one hour or more, from 6 a.m. or thereabouts to 7 a.m. or later, the helmsman, Mr. McLeod, was absent from the wheel and was going through the sheep, and during this time the ship was steered by Mr. Clarke, the officer on the watch. It follows that during this time an efficient lookout could not be kept astern. This was also the position when McLeod returned to the wheel, because Mr. Clarke then left the bridge to feed the horse. In our opinion, it is at least possible that it was while Mr. Clarke was attending to the horse that the raider first became visible. We are not disposed to blame either Mr. Clarke or the helmsman for the defective manner in which the lookout was kept on the Holmwood during these absences of McLeod and Clarke from the bridge. They appear to us to have acted in accordance with practices which have become usual on small ships similar to the Holmwood. Nor can we say, with confidence, that either of these absences caused delay in discovering the presence of the raider. But it is our duty to say that in wartime such practices are dangerous on any ship. In our opinion:

no ship which goes to sea is entitled to assume that the portion of the sea in which it voyages is immune from the menace of enemy raiders;
it is consequently the duty of every ship, both to itself and to other shipping, to maintain in every direction continuous lookout with the utmost vigilance so as to ensure that it will discover any other ship as soon as it becomes visible; and
this duty is paramount and overrides all peacetime practices and considerations of mere convenience. It will be observed from the evidence that Mr. Walsh, National President of the Federated Seamen's Union, agrees that such a duty exists, and that its performance is feasible.

Upon the evidence, we are not in a position to determine whether the terms of the Admiralty Instructions as to wireless were made known to the Second Officer. We do not find against him that they were, nor against the Captain that they wore not. If the Captain did not in fact communicate those instructions to his officers, that was a breach of the instructions. And for the future guidance of all masters we think that the following passage at p. 908 of the evidence of Commodore Parry should be emphasized, viz.:

"There is no doubt in my mind that the officers of a ship like that should know an instruction of that kind because they represent the Captain on the bridge when they are on watch and in the absence of the Captain may have to act on those instructions."

We add that we entirely agree with the opinion here expressed by the Commodore, which is in complete Conformity with a passage in the instructions themselves. The officer of the watch will be aided in the performance of his duty if he clearly understands how important are his duties of unremitting vigilance and prompt report. And if the Captain should be incapacitated by illness or accident, his duties of prompt suspicion and prompt decision may fall on others. It is essential that they be made acquainted in advance with the exact nature of duties which they may have to perform. It is the duty of every master to make a thorough study of all instructions received by him. If he does this, he will find that they clearly inform him to what extent it is his duty to see that certain important portions of these instructions are thoroughly understood by his officers.

In this case it is plain that the Second Officer did not call the Captain as soon as he saw the ship. In our opinion, he should have done so, and his failure to do so increased the Captain's difficulties. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the Captain had ample time to realize that the wireless message should be sent, and to attempt to send it. Clarke says he called the Captain at 7.10 a.m. The Captain says he was not called until 7.25 a.m. or 7.30 a.m. In our opinion, each of these is an estimated and not an observed time. The time at which the Captain was called may have been as late as he says. But he also says that when he was called the nearest raider was then only 2 miles away. After the most careful consideration, we find ourselves unable to accept this. In our opinion, the distance was then not less than 5 miles. Clarke has given two estimates of this distance. At p. 101 of the evidence he put it at 8 miles. At p. 884, which records evidence given by him on a different date, he estimated it at 6 miles. But even if both these estimates of Clarke be totally disregarded, we are of opinion that the weight of the remaining evidence and the probabilities are both against the view that by 7.30a.m. any raider had got as close to the Holmwood as 2 miles. Nor can we concede that even if that had been so, the situation would have exonerated the Captain from attempting the sending of the message. Even at a range of 2 miles it is by no means certain that it would have been within the power of the raider's guns to have prevented the sending of the message, or of a sufficient portion thereof to be useful.

Captain Miller put forward the contention that it would have been useless to send the message because his wireless set could not reach Now Zealand and because the Chathams' wireless station would not be open till 9 a.m. For the following reasons we are unable to accept this explanation:

It is not established that the set could not reach New Zealand. On the contrary, the weight of evidence is distinctly against that view, and suggests that any difficulty experienced with the set in pre-war time was due to faulty manipulation. It had been passed by the Post and Telegraph Department as recently as June, 1940;
Even if the set could not reach New Zealand, or if Captain Miller thought it could not, he could not be sure that a message might not reach some other ship;
If he thought his set insufficient to reach New Zealand, he should not have been travelling with it without complaint to his owners. And he had made no such complaint. (Evidence of Captain Holm at p. 454-456.)

It seems to us that Captain Miller lost valuable time in endeavouring to decipher a flag message exhibited by an alleged Japanese ship, the bona fides of which he then suspected, or should have suspected. During this time, or earlier, he should have been sending his wireless message. We recognize his difficulties were increased by the circumstance that he was himself the wireless signaller and that to send the message he would have to leave his post on the bridge at a moment when he felt the Captain should be in charge. In this respect he was at a disadvantage compared with the masters of the Rangitane and the Komatu each of whom had a wireless operator, or operators. Further, it is not reasonable to expect of a master the technical skill of a specialist wireless operator; and it is a natural human weakness to be slow in attempting strange duties. But, though we think it fair to mention these matters, we are clear that they do not excuse Captain Miller's failure to attempt the sending of the wireless message. He should have realized that this was by far the most urgent of his duties. He alone could do it. Others could have read the flag signal or have destroyed the confidential papers.

Since this Commission began to sit, the Shipping Radio Emergency Regulations 1941 (Serial number 1941/27) were gazetted on 19th February, 1911. One of the objects of these regulations appears to be to provide, so far as is reasonably possible in each particular case, for the carriage of a wireless operator or operators who will be free from other duties. How far it will be found possible to go in this direction must depend on the supply of operators available. Even under the new regulations it may sometimes prove difficult to avoid a situation in which the captain or some officer is the only wireless operator.

We also direct attention to pp. 1268-80 of the evidence. This shows that at a late stage of our inquiries the view was put before us and was supported by Mr. Steel, of the Post and Telegraph Department, that in the matter of the Holmwood, New Zealand infringed an International Convention to which New Zealand was a party, in that according to the Convention the Holmwood should have been compelled by the New Zealand authorities to carry an operator who possessed a higher certificate than Captain Miller possessed, and was free to keep hours of wireless service scheduled in the Convention which Captain Miller, in view of his other duties as master, could not keep. In view of this suggestion, we intimated that we desired to hear from the Marine Department on the matter. Mr. Millier, of that Department, attended before us. There were also present Mr. Steel, and Mr. Currie, of the Crown Law Office, and there ensued the evidence and discussion reported at pp. 1268-79. It is, of course, no answer to Mr. Steel's suggestion to establish that what was done upon the Holmwood complied with the New Zealand regulations, because of the exercise of a power of exemption which the New Zealand regulations conferred upon the Minister of Marine. The regulations empowered the Minister to exempt from the New Zealand regulations. They could not empower him, and did not purport to empower him, to exempt from the Convention to which New Zealand was a party. The only other answer which Mr. Millier suggested was that the Holmwood came within a certain exception from the Convention which New Zealand obtained at Washington in 1927, and which appears as a footnote on p. 44 of the print of the Cairo revision of 1938. But that exception is in terms limited to New Zealand ships of small tonnage "which do not go far from the coast of New Zealand." As at present advised, we cannot accept the view that a ship which voyages between New Zealand and the Chathams does not go far from the coast of New Zealand. As Mr. Millier appeared to us to be somewhat taken by surprise by the point, we intimated that if, on the succeeding day, his Department desired to be heard further on the matter, opportunity would be afforded it. But we have not had any further communication from the Marine Department. We therefore commend to the attention of the authorities the question whether the continuation upon a ship trading with the Chathams of the wireless arrangements which existed on the Holmwood would be in accordance with the International Conventions to which New Zealand is a party.

But, in our view, if it ever happens that the captain is the only person who can send the wireless message, then when the position arises that the message should be sent, he should leave his post on the bridge to send it.

Counsel for Captain Miller submitted that, in law, his client was not bound to send the message. He conceded that the Shipping Control Emergency Regulations 1939 purport to empower the Naval Board to require a master to do various things, including the giving of signals or communications of any kind. But he relies on Regulation 2 (3), which provides that a master to whom a notification is given by the Naval Board shall comply therewith "with all reasonable speed, perils of the sea, and restraint of princes alone excepted." The argument is that Captain Miller was at the moment under such restraint. But so, in a greater or less degree, is every master for whom arises the occasion to send this particular wireless message. In reality, therefore, the argument amounts to a submission that a mariner is not obliged to send a message that he is being restrained by princes, until he has ceased to be restrained by princes. This, in effect, disputes the legality of the Naval Instructions quoted as "A" In so far as it is within our province to express an opinion on this question of law, we think the instructions are binding. The regulations empower the Naval Board to require a master to give signals or communications of any kind. If the matter stood thus, no question could be raised. The exception may not be happily expressed. But we think it should be construed as limited to instructions which can be usefully followed even after the restraint of princes is removed, but as having no application to instructions which in precise terms require the master to defy the restraint of princes. Captain Miller himself was under the impression that the instructions were binding upon him (Evidence, p. 31). We are disposed to agree with him. But it is obvious that since the language of the regulations is capable of raising undesirable argument and doubt, their amendment might usefully be considered by the responsible authorities. Our enemies have forced the British mercantile marine and the civilian population of the United Kingdom into the forefront of battle. And each class is eager to accept all consequential duties clearly indicated to it by authority. We are fully aware that any attempt to send the message would have brought about the shelling of the Holmwood, and that this might have meant heavy loss of life, including the lives of women and children. But, having regard to the methods of warfare with which we are faced, that consideration is irrelevant. Loss of civilian lives must be faced in an effort to locate and destroy raiders. This should be realized by persons who travel by sea, and by the parents of children who travel by sea; and, lest the cool, prompt judgment of masters be hampered at critical moments, there should, we suggest, be no unnecessary passenger traffic.

In this particular case it must be recorded that the consequences of Captain Miller's failure to send the wireless message were, in all probability, serious. In our opinion, had the message been attempted, it would probably have reached New Zealand, or if the enemy had attempted to jam the message, this jamming would have been heard in New Zealand. The evidence of Commodore Parry at pp. 901-3 establishes that the receipt of such a message in New Zealand would have resulted in the recall of the Rangitane, which had left her anchorage off Rangitoto at about 5.30 a.m. that morning. Having regard to the position then existing (see Evidence, p. 915) it is also clear that the receipt of a message from the Holmwood would have given the Navy certain advantages in searching for the raiders which did not exist at a later date.

We now deal with the circumstances surrounding the loss of the Rangitane. The Rangitane left the wharf at Auckland shortly after 1 p.m. Sunday, the 24th November, 1940. During the night of the 24th-25th November, she lay at anchor off Rangitoto, and moved from that anchorage at about 5.30 a.m. on Monday, the 25th November. It was at 8 a.m. on that same day that the Holmwood was captured. At about 2 p.m. that day the raiders, having sunk the Holmwood, left the locality where that had happened. At 3.40 a.m. on Wednesday, the 27th November, the Rangitane encountered the same three German raiders as had captured the Holmwood. This happened at approximately 37° 00' S., 176° 00' W. It appears to be established that the Rangitane travelled some 465 miles while the raiders travelled some 410 miles. The night was dark but clear. The evidence is that two of the raiders, each of which was then about three-quarters of a mile from the Rangitane, were observed by separate lookouts practically simultaneously, that prompt report was made to the bridge, that Captain Upton was promptly called by telephone, and that he promptly came out on the bridge. He saw the two ships which were then respectively on his port bow, and his starboard quarter. Almost immediately afterwards, he saw the third ship very fine on his starboard quarter. Captain Upton, with great expedition, then did the following things: He ordered the gun's crew to close up and be ready for action; he had the Chief Officer called, and this officer promptly joined him on the bridge. Meanwhile, Captain Upton had ordered the wireless-room to send the "suspicious vessel" message, and, if the raiders opened fire (which the Captain expected would happen as soon as his wireless was used), to send the "raider message." He also ordered "utmost speed" by engine-room telegraph, and warned the engine-room that an attack by raiders was anticipated. He next starboarded his helm, first three points and then another four points, so that his ship should present its stern and not its beam to that raider which seemed to him in the best position to fire. All this was done rapidly, and up to this time, the raiders had not fired. The Germans were signalling in Morse; but Captain Upton did not allow himself to be distracted from his pressing duties by any attempt to read this message. He was busy with the decisions and orders which we have just recited. He then sent the Chief Officer aft to report when the gun was ready for action, and told him that if he (Captain Upton) decided to open fire, the fire was to be directed against the raider on his port quarter. While the Chief Officer was on his way aft, the raider switched on searchlights and opened fire. Shortly afterwards, the Germans switched off this searchlight, but continued firing. Damage was done to the ship, including the steering-gear, and casualties were suffered. Meanwhile, the confidential papers were destroyed, some by the Fourth Officer and some by Captain Upton, and the two wireless messages were being sent. The complete messages reached New Zealand. Each was repeated, the first two or three times, and the second six or seven times. The shelling broke a valve of the main transmitter, and while the Second and Third Operators got a new valve, the Chief Operator (Mr. Hallett) switched on to the emergency set, and then back to the main set when it was repaired. In our opinion, the wireless operators of the Rangitane performed their important duties in a manner that deserves commendation. When Captain Upton had ascertained that the wireless messages had gone, he ordered the operators to cease sending, and he stopped the ship. The time was then 3.59 a.m., so that the whole of the events now narrated, from the time the Captain was roused from sleep, up to the stopping of the ship, occupied only nineteen minutes. The raiders continued firing after the ship stopped. Captain Upton sent a message to them that there were women aboard. Shortly afterwards the firing ceased.

A German boarding party then approached and, as soon as it was within hailing distance, ordered immediate abandonment of ship; and when the Germans actually boarded the Rangitane they pressed the necessity of hurried abandonment.

The Rangitane did not, in fact, attempt to use her gun. Early in the firing and while the German searchlights were still on, the Chief Officer telephoned that he was ready to open fire, but Captain Upton replied to him, by telephone, "We will not open fire." His reasons fur this decision were two-first, he feared that to fire on the raiders might lead them to retaliate with a torpedo, and that while his ship might be able to stand a good deal of punishment by shell-fire, one successful shot by a torpedo might suffice to capsize and sink her. It did not, at the moment, occur to him that the position he had attained by manoeuvre had made the torpedoing of his ship difficult. Secondly, the searchlights were then still on. He considered that the blinding effect of the searchlight would make it impossible for his gun's crew to do any damage to the raiders. He was under the impression that the gun was not equipped with anti-dazzle shades. According to the evidence of Henderson (p. 1076), a member of the gun's crew, they had such shades. It also appears from Henderson's evidence (p. 1072), and from the evidence of Rees, Quartermaster of the Rangitane (p. 1078), that the gun had first to be uncovered by the gun's crew because the practice was to keep it covered in the Pacific. They succeeded in getting it uncovered before the Germans opened fire, but had not then had time to load. In our opinion, to travel with the gun covered is an undesirable practice. We are also of opinion that every master should be familiar with all facts as to the equipment of the gun, because they are among the factors which may influence decisions he may be called upon to make in a sudden emergency.

The evidence indicates that an impression is current among at least some of the survivors that on the Rangitane's last voyage to New Zealand, which was safely accomplished, Captain Upton disobeyed his instructions, but that he acted in obedience to his instructions on the Rangitane's last voyage from New Zealand on which she was captured and sunk. Certain statements which appeared in the press shortly after the rescue of the survivors and which have been produced to us in our opinion, also convey this impression. We have therefore been at pains to examine this question with care. In the result, we find it proved by the evidence, including the evidence of Captain Upton himself, that upon his voyage from Now Zealand he did not disobey his instructions, and that he had obeyed them on his voyage to New Zealand. The true facts are thus very different from what many persons have believed them to be. This misunderstanding has, in our opinion, happened without anything approaching bad faith on the part of Captain Upton. Still less do we think the press to blame for the misunderstanding. How this misunderstanding has come about is explained in Appendix B to this report. Inasmuch us that appendix discusses frankly topics upon which it might be of advantage to the enemy to obtain information, it cannot, in our opinion, be published. All that it is here possible to say is that the misunderstanding has arisen from the fact that the language actually used by Captain Upton has had to be applied, by persons who heard or read it, to matters upon which the facts are necessarily kept secret.

The Germans claimed that they met the Rangitane by design and not by accident, and that they were in possession of information which enabled them to intercept her. This is believed by many of the survivors from the captured ships, including Captains Miller and Upton. The next question for consideration is whether the evidence establishes that the Germans possessed any such information.

The claims of the German Commander, as recited by Captain Miller (p. 76), included a definite claim that "he knew the times when all ships left New Zealand and Australia every day." Captain Upton's account of this particular claim is at pp. 299, 300, and 303. He recites the German Commander as having said when they were approaching Nauru, "I know the ships will be there. I know the sailings from New Zealand, and I know the positions of the cruisers." These were claims to have systematic access to sources of complete information on these topics. Having regard to the amount of sea traffic from New Zealand, the actual successes of the raiders in the Pacific over a period of months do not appear consistent with their having had, during that period, any such information as Captains Miller and Upton report the German Commander as having claimed. Secondly, if he really had such complete and regular information, it does not seem probable that he would reveal the fact, or, alternatively, that he would afterwards release the persons to whom he had made such revelations. The statements attributed to him seem to us to be more likely part of an attempt to impress his captives, and, through them, to disseminate uneasiness and distrust in New Zealand, or they may have been manifestations of boastfulness and of a taste for melodrama. The accounts which Captains Miller and Upton give of their interviews with this German Commander create the impression that he took a good deal of trouble to impress them with his cleverness and his omniscience. And some of his subordinates, particularly an Engineer Officer named Marks, appear to have conducted themselves similarly in their interviews and conversations with other captives. The evidence has, however, brought to light facts which, in our opinion, tell strongly against the genuineness of the claims made by the German Commander. For example, we refer to the evidence of Captain Miller at pp. 45, 46, 604, and 605. This clearly establishes that, immediately after the capture of the Holmwood, the German Commander was at considerable pains to ascertain from Captain Miller the identity of the British cruiser which the German then believed to be at Lyttelton. Captain Miller was able to say truthfully that he did not know, because he did not even know that there was then any cruiser in that port. It is established by the evidence that in fact there was. But having regard to where this cruiser and the Germans had probably been just prior to the 25th November, it is easily understood that one of the raiders or their plane might have caught sight of the cruiser when it was heading for Lyttelton. The important thing is that the German was obviously very anxious to discover which cruiser it was. He kept at Captain Miller about it for some time, and finally said, "Ach ! I will get to know. I have a friend on board this afternoon." This appears to be the attitude and language of an earnest interrogator who hoped to trap Captain Miller into the disclosure of information, which the interrogator desired to obtain, and had no other means of obtaining. It further appears from the evidence of other Holmwood survivors that, immediately after the capture of the Holmwood, subordinate members of the German crew appeared to be in a hurry to get away from the locality, because they feared there was a British warship somewhere in the neighbourhood; but they were in error as to the identity of the warship which they named.

Then there is the evidence of Mrs. Jeffery, a Rangitane survivor, at pp. 922 et seq. She and other women were taken to that raider which the captives called the Narvik, and on this ship they spent the first three days of their captivity. It appears from Mrs. Jeffery's evidence that during this time these women were subjected to repeated interrogation. This was not done under cover of casual conversation, but was a formal matter conducted by an officer seated at a table with writing materials before him. According to Mrs. Jeffery, the women were called to the table one at a time, and the process was repeated several times, and on one occasion they were roused from sleep for interrogation. Mrs. Jeffery says the topics on which questions were put were always the same - viz, " Had they heard of the losses of the Turakina and of the Niagara, and what had the New Zealand newspapers said about those events? At what ports was the Rangitane to call? Where was she going to pick up convoy? Was she to call at Panama? How did the Captain of the Rangitane get his orders? Did they know what route he was going on? What boats were in port in New Zealand? On what dates were these boats sailing? Why the famous Achilles was not out after the raiders in consequence of Rangitane's S.O.S.?" We accept the evidence of this witness as being reliable. It appears to us inconsistent with the possession by the German Commander of the knowledge Captains Miller and Upton report him as claiming in their interviews with him.

This evidence of Mrs. Jeffery is important in another way. She says (pp. 924 and 930) that there were some foreign women among the captives on the Narvik during these first three days. They were interrogated, but in the German language, and after the interrogating officer had gone away they refused to tell the British women anything of what had passed in German between themselves and their interrogator. There is other evidence from other survivors that these foreign women, and certain foreign men who were on the Rangitane, appeared to become friendly with the Germans. There was thus available to the Germans an obvious source from which they may have obtained information as to the movements of the Rangitane from the time she left the Auckland wharf even if they did not succeed in getting this from unguarded remarks made by British captives in casual conversation. It is plain that, from whatever source he got his information, the German Commander in his subsequent conversations with Captains Upton and Miller made a considerable parade of his knowledge of the fact that the Rangitane had lain off Rangitoto throughout Sunday night and had moved from anchorage only early on Monday morning.

Whether it is proper to accept as genuine the large claim made by the German Commander may be tested in another way. Was he always right in the information he claimed to have? He was not. If he has been correctly understood by Captains Miller and Upton he was entirely wrong upon at least one topic. According to Captain Miller he claimed to know exactly what was being done from Now Zealand in the way of aerial reconnaissance. Captain Upton's account of this is not quite the same as Captain Miller's, but it, too, recites the German as claiming to have had a remarkable degree of information about New Zealand aerial reconnaissance. The German appears to have described this with some particularity, and also the action which he himself took consequent upon his alleged knowledge. The references to this matter are at pp. 73-75, and 317 of the evidence. The topic is not one which can be fully discussed in a report which may be published; but the evidence establishes beyond all possible doubt that if the German claimed what Captains Miller and Upton understood him to claim, then he was deliberately and falsely imposing on them. The aerial reconnaissance from New Zealand was not conducted in the method he elaborately described, nor in a way which at all resembled what he described. The evidence from survivors justifies the conclusion that at about 6 p.m. on the day following the capture of the Rangitane at least one of the German raiders sighted something which they believed might be a reconnaissance plane from New Zealand and signalled a warning to the others, but that the plane, if it was a plane, failed to see the Germans, and the alarm was consequently of short duration. It seems probable that the German Commander was prompted by this incident to invent, for the benefit of his captives, an elaborate story as to how aerial reconnaissances from New Zealand were conducted, that he knew all about it, and was consequently able to arrange in advance how to keep himself out of sight. A sufficient answer to all this is that it is demonstrated by evidence which we accept as completely reliable that aerial reconnaissance from New Zealand was quite otherwise than the German is said to have elaborately described. Reference to the evidence as at pp. 173-175, 994-996.

Further, the German Commander added the statement that they had intercepted a certain message sent by the reconnaissance plane. It is demonstrated in the evidence that this is impossible, because no such message was in fact sent.

Having considered the evidence, including evidence of officers who took part in searches, we do not at all reject the possibility that at about 6 p.m. on 27th November one of the German ships momentarily sighted a New Zealand reconnaissance plane which failed to see any of the German ships. Such a happening is possible without any negligence by the watchers ill the plane. It depends on many factors, including backgrounds, whether a plane and a ship will at the same moment of time be visible to each other, or whether one of them may succeed in picking up the other, while itself remaining invisible to diligent watchers on the ship or plane which it has seen.

Reference was made by Captain Upton and other witnesses to the circumstance that the Germans had in their possession a photograph or photographs of the Rangitane. Captain Upton was shown what purported to be such a photograph by the German Commander. His evidence as to this is at pp. 285 et seq. He thought it was a photograph of the Rangitane, taken not more than six months before it was shown to him, from a launch in the neighbourhood of Rangitoto. For any enemy agent to get such a thing out of New Zealand into the hands of the raiders would present some difficulty. But it is possible to think of more than one way in which that difficulty could be overcome. The puzzling thing, however, is why should an enemy agent bother to overcome this difficulty unless the photograph would be of value to the enemy. Captain Upton admits that, he himself cannot perceive how the photograph he saw would have been of the slightest assistance to the raiders. He says the incident impressed him as an example of "the German's amazing thoroughness." This shows that Captain Upton himself accepted the photograph as something which had been obtained by the raiders from an enemy agent in New Zealand. But the German Commander did not ever make that claim. He merely casually mentioned to Captain Upton the photograph which was lying on the Commander's table, and said, "That is a photograph of your ship." There is a good deal of evidence that at least one series of photographs purporting to be of the Rangitane, but in fact of the Rangitata, was on sale to Rangitane passengers. In our opinion much the most probable explanation of this incident is that what was shown to Captain Upton was one of this series, or of a similar series, and that it had been recovered by the Germans on their search of the Rangitane. Captain Upton's evidence (p. 206) describes that search as having been very thorough. It would be natural for the German Commander to retain such a photograph for inclusion in a private album recording his successes.

There was also a suggestion that the Germans had a photograph of the Rangitane taken in Auckland Harbour from the air. Evidence as to this is at. pp. 856-858. We are not satisfied that this was a photograph of the Rangitane and not of some other Rangi ship. However, that may he, we cannot follow what use it would have been to the raiders, and neither can the witness who deposes to having seen it. He was Barker, the Rangitane boatswain, who says it was shown to him by the German Officer, Marks. This witness accepts the view that it is possible that this photograph was simply something in the possession of a passenger or member of the crew which the Germans obtained on searching the ship. In our opinion, this is the most probable explanation.

In some instances it is plain that stories which have obtained widespread belief among the captives, and have made great impression upon some of them are, in truth, devoid of foundation. The situation in which the captives found themselves was peculiarly propitious to the growth and propagation of confusions, misunderstandings, and unfounded rumours. The captives had little else to occupy their time or their minds but to discuss among themselves the Germans claims that they had secret sources of information. Two instances of such unfounded stories are worthy of special mention. It was widely believed that the German Commander displayed knowledge of the time to the exact minute at which the Rangitane had left the Auckland wharf, and of the time to the exact minute at which she weighed anchor off Rangitoto. In our opinion, investigation established that he made no such claim.

It was also widely believed that the day before they captured the Rangitane the Germans foretold that next day they would capture "a big two-funnelled ship." Having heard and considered all the evidence in support of this, we do not believe it was said.

Captain Miller, in evidence before us stated that, in the presence of Captain Upton and himself either the Commander of the raider or the Prize Officer gave the times to the minute that the Rangitane left the wharf at Auckland on Sunday, the 24th November, and when she weighed anchor off Rangitoto the following morning that he mentioned the time of leaving the wharf as some named number of minutes after 1 p.m.; and of weighing anchor off Rangitoto as some named number of minutes after 5 a.m.; that Captain Miller did not in either case catch the actual minutes that were mentioned by the German, but that Captain Upton must have heard them because he afterwards said to Captain Miller, "How did the blighter know that ? ", or "How did he get to know that ?", or " I wonder how on earth he knew that?" Captain Upton on the other hand, states that, while the Captain or the Prize Officer of the raider claimed to know that he had anchored off Rangitoto on the night of 24-25th November, neither of them ever mentioned any time at all at which the Rangitane had left Auckland or had weighed anchor off Rangitoto, that the time was never discussed at all, and that he, Captain Upton, could not have checked the time had it been mentioned, because he did not himself know the time when the Rangitane weighed anchor off Rangitoto. To all of this Captain Upton adhered, even when he was informed by us what Captain Miller's evidence upon this matter had been. As Captain Miller cannot say what minutes the German mentioned, and as his recollection is not clear as to the actual hour mentioned, in view of the very definite statement of Captain Upton that time was not mentioned at all, we are constrained to say that Captain Miller is mistaken on this point.

This conversation happened two or three days after the capture of the Rangitane and it is plain that the information that the Rangitane had anchored off Rangitoto on the night of 24-25th November could easily have been ascertained by the Germans from some of the Rangitane crew or passengers.

Captain Upton, in his evidence, stated that one of the grounds for his belief that the Germans were lying in wait for him on the route he was following was that on the afternoon of the day on which his ship was sunk he was informed by Captain Miller that on the previous day the Germans had told him (Captain Miller) that they were going to capture a big two-funnelled ship next morning. Captain Miller emphatically denies that he ever told Captain Upton anything of the kind. Captain Miller is emphatic that no German said to him on the day before the capture of the Rangitane, or at any time, that they were going to get a big two-funnelled ship or a big ship the next day. He says that the first he knew of a two-funnelled ship was when the Rangitane was being attacked and a German sentry passed the word through the door to the Holmwood captives that the raider was attacking a big two-funnelled ship. Later the sentry said they had captured the Rangitiki, but at 6 a.m. he told Captain Miller and others that it was the Raniltane. By that time the captives from the Rangitane had come aboard the raider, so that the sentry knew definitely the name of the ship the raider had captured.

We next had the evidence of Miss Hough, a passenger from the Chathams on the Holmwood. She says that on the day following the capture of the Holmwood she was one of a group of women who were told by a German sentry on guard outside their cabin not to be afraid if they heard gunfire in the early morning. Miss Hough was pressed as to whether the German said anything further. At first she persisted that this was all he had said, but upon being asked whether he had mentioned what kind of a ship they were going to take, she suddenly seemed to remember that he told them that it was a big English ship. It is extraordinary that, although it is alleged that these words were used to a group of women, not one of them made any comment upon it after the German went away. When the attack started early in the morning not one of them made any reference to what the German sentry had previously told them. Miss Hough is quite uncertain as to the time of the day or night the words were used. Her evidence is at variance with the signed statement made by her in Auckland, in which she said that some of the Germans had boasted that they were going to get a big English ship the next day. This she now says is quite wrong. The strong probability is that something was said by the sentry during the attack on the Rangitane to the effect that they were attacking a big English ship and that Miss Hough is mistaken in thinking it was said earlier.

Mrs. Idiens, another passenger from the Chathams, and a cousin of Miss Hough, said she heard first from her husband and then in the ladies' cabin from the boatswain or one of the guards on the raider that they would be getting a big ship that night or next day. She cannot remember whether she heard this in the morning or afternoon, but says that, it was during the hours of daylight. She says that the German did not mention the nationality of the ship, but that he merely said they were taking a big ship. Early in the morning some one came into the cabin, but she could not be sure whether it was the same man or not, and woke up the women, told them to get dressed, and to dress the children as they were all to have breakfast at 5 a.m. This man then went away, and later returned and told them not to be afraid if they heard firing. But the amazing thing is that Mrs. Idiens cannot definitely recollect any conversation amongst the ladies about the alleged statement made by the boatswain that they were going to get a big ship that night or next day, nor any reference to that statement when they were aroused from sleep next morning and the firing began. Again we are forced to the conclusion that the first she, or any of the captives, heard of the big ship was after the attack on the Rangitane commenced. It may be observed here that Mrs. Idiens' mind was in a receptive state as to what the Germans alleged they knew, by reason of the fact that shortly after the capture of the Holmwood she was startled to hear the German officer Marks telling her husband of the cablegram sent to their relatives in New Zealand advising of their intended arrival on that voyage of the Holmwood. Mr. Idiens, the husband of the last witness, says that at 4 p.m. on the 26th November one of the guards in charge of the women told him to tell his wife not to be frightened if they heard the guns going that night because they were going to get a big ship. He did not say they were going to get an English ship; he did not make any mention of a two-funnelled ship. Idiens says he told his wife this in the ladies' cabin, but cannot remember whether or not any of the other ladies there heard him tell her. He thinks, however, that the others would know, because he says it was a general opinion among the captives that the Germans were after the Rangitane. This, he says, arose out of the fact that Mr. Le Cren, Second Engineer of the Holmwood, had worked out that the course of the raiders would take them across the route from Auckland to Panama, that Le Cren was conversant with the sailing dates of the Rangi ships, and that they would no doubt come upon the Rangitane on her voyage from Auckland to Panama. Rut Mr. Le Cren in his evidence states most definitely that he never even thought of the Panama route, that he had no idea of any of the Rangi ships being in the vicinity, and that he never voiced the opinion that the next ship might be a Rangi ship. He persisted in this even after he was told what Mr. Idiens had said, and maintained that Mr. Idiens was definitely wrong.

The evidence of Mr. Le Cren is completely corroborated by Mr. Waterhouse, an ordinary seaman off the Holmwood, at p. 776. Furthermore, Mr. Le Cren says that he did not at any time hear any rumours among the Holmwood captives that the Germans had said they were going to get a big ship the next day, or a two-funnelled ship, or a big English ship, but that the first he heard of these rumours was after the Rangitane was captured. The first he heard about the Rangitane was when the guard told him during the attack that it was a big two-funnelled ship of about 16,000 tons. He then, for the first time, thought it might be a Rangi ship, and that it might be the Rangitata, not the Rangitane. In discussing the matter then, Captain Miller thought it might be the Rangitane because he knew she was in New Zealand when the Holmwood left for the Chathams on her first trip. It is significant that when the attack started there was, according to all the evidence, the same complete absence of any conversation among the male captives as there was among the females to indicate that any of them knew beforehand that it was the Rangitane or any big ship that was being attacked.

In view of all this evidence, and having had the advantage of observing the demeanour of the witnesses, we find it impossible to hold that any of the Germans ever said to any of the captives from the Holmwood on the day before the capture of the Rangitane that they were going to take a big two-funnelled ship, or a big ship, or a big English ship, next morning. The only evidence to this effect is the evidence of Mr. and Mrs. Idiens and Miss Hough. It is significant also that not one of the officers and not one of the crew of the Holmwood made any mention whatever of these things. On the contrary, there is evidence to show that no claim was made by any of the Germans of the matters mentioned by Mr. and Mrs. Idiens and Miss Hough. Mr. Clarke, Second Officer of the Holmwood, says that when the Rangitane was attacked a German came below to them and told them that they had taken a British ship, and later others came down and said they had taken the Rangitiki. Further, Mr. Clarke says that two or three Germans told him that they had come upon the Rangitane unexpectedly, and one of the crew said it was a great surprise to them to get a big ship like that.

Mr. Abernethy, Chief Engineer of the Holmwood, Mr. Campbell, First Officer, Mr. McLeod, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. P. J. Stiles, able seamen, all of the Holmwood, say that they did not hear any such claim, and that no such claim was discussed among the captives before the Rangitane was sunk. Mr. Macmillan, steward, says he was one of the first to wake up when preparations for the attack on the Rangitane were being made. He did not hear any one say that it must be the big ship, the two-funnelled ship, or anything like that during the time the preparations were being made, or during the attack, and did not himself know what it was. Mr. Waterhouse, ordinary seaman, says the first he heard of an attack was about 3a.m., when the Germans were summoned to action stations. He then asked a German carpenter (who was acting as a guard) what the disturbance was. This German ordered them to get up and pack their hammocks. He thinks that he figured right away that it might have been the Achilles or the Hector or an armed ship, when they made them get up. Then the young carpenter came down and said it was a two-funnelled ship, and Mr. Waterhouse says they thought it might have been the Awatea, and when the carpenter said it was 16,000 tons, they thought it might have been the Aorangi or one of the Rangi boats. Idiens and Captain Miller and all the male captives from the Holmwood were present when that was said.

In the result, the only captives from the Holmwood who say that they were actually warned that there would be gunfire that night, and that the Germans would get a ship next day, were Mr. and Mrs. Idiens and Miss Hough. The Captain, officers, and crew of the Holmwood, and all the other passengers of the Holmwood, heard nothing of those matters. Mr. McMahon, one of the passengers who gave evidence before us, says that all the men off the Holmwood were in the same compartment, fairly closely confined, and that there was no discussion about the coming capture of any ship. He further says that on the morning the Rangitane was sunk, he was the first to find out what ship it was. He said that they were merely conjecturing as to her identity when some one passed a remark that a German guard said it was a big English ship, and they, in their compartment, were guessing as to what ship it might be, and after a while he went up the steps and looked down the companion-way and saw a number of men filing through. The guard ordered him below, and he went. Later he went up to the bathroom, which was on the second dock, and, while there, the Chief Engineer of the Rangitane came in and told him what ship he was off. McMahon then went below and told the other men that it was the Rangitane, and that way tile first indication of what ship it was.

The evidence of Mr. Waterhouse, ordinary seaman on the Holmwood, is that the Germans told the women not to be alarmed if the guns went off as some of the guns were situated immediately above the women's quarters. This is what created in the minds of Mr. and Mrs. Idiens and Miss Hough the belief that the Germans had warned them specially of this particular occasion. The weight of evidence is overwhelmingly against any special warning having been given, or that the Germans expected to get a ship next day, and the evidence of Mr. and Mrs. Idiens and Miss Hough must therefore be rejected.

Although many of the survivors from the captured ships appear to believe that the Germans must have had access to illegitimate sources of information, it is also true that many of them have emerged from their experiences without forming that impression. The signed statements of many survivors contain statements to the effect that they did not hear any German say anything that leads to the conclusion that the Germans had such information. And of the witnesses who have personally testified before us, at least two, Mr. Angus Macdonald, Chief Engineer of the Komata, and Mr. Frank Rees, Quartermaster of the Rangitane-said, in no uncertain manner, that they were familiar with the rumours which were current among the captives that the Germans had secret information, but that neither of them believed there was any foundation at all for such a belief.

In matter published in the press shortly after the rescue of the survivors mention was made of a "high Judicial official" and his wife, and of statements attributed to them. It is plain that these are references to Mr. and Mrs. William H. Stuart. Mr. Stuart had been Chief Justice of Tonga, and had recently been appointed Second Puisne Judge of British Guiana. He and Mrs. Stuart were passengers on the Rangitane at the time of her capture. After their rescue they were for a short time in New Zealand; but, unfortunately, they had left New Zealand before we were appointed, and we were thus unable to obtain any viva voce evidence from them. Pursuant to our powers, we have, however, examined the statements which they gave to the New Zealand police and the records of interviews they had with Naval authorities both in Australia and New Zealand. Mrs. Stuart does not appear to have committed herself to any definite expression of opinion as to whether the Germans had secret information. It is, however, otherwise with Mr. Stuart. The New Zealand police officer who interviewed him in Auckland reports that Mr. Stuart, at his own desire, dictated his own statement, and that it was taken down word for word. As thus recorded, it contains the following passage :

" They met the Rangitane by appointment. They know exactly where to find her. They complained to Captain Upton that on the way to New Zealand he had not followed the Naval instructions, and they had therefore missed the ship; but they congratulated him on having followed the Naval instructions on the way out as to the course. They had full information as to the amount of cargo and its nature before they took the ship, as to the course to be taken, and the delay of some hours taken by Captain Upton in the Hauraki Gulf. Find the men who know the cargo; find the men who know the Naval course; find the men who could have seen the delay in the Hauraki Gulf. I suggest that those, if any, who figure on all three lists, whoever they are, should be interned for the duration of the war."

In view of the offices Mr. Stuart has held, and to which he has boon appointed, we have considered with particular care the record of what he has said, and the conclusions to which he came. In the result, we have a clear opinion that his conclusions are not justified by a full consideration of the whole of the available evidence. In our opinion, there is no ground whatever for concluding that, before they encountercd the Rangitane, the Germans knew anything whatever about her cargo, her course, or her delay at Rangitoto. They pretended, after the capture, to have known of these things; apparently Mr. Stuart is among the persons whom they successfully deceived. A later portion of Mr. Stuart's statement contains the following passage, and the following grave allegation against those in charge of aeroplane search for the Rangitane :-

"We were all ordered down below, and we thought it was the Yankee Clipper diverted. My sanity reeled at the fact. It is apparently undisputed that New Zealand planes saw us just as they saw the ships that sank the Turakina, and no further action was taken. I submit that the persons responsible for that lack of action should, in the interests of New Zealand, be placed under control for the duration of the war. I have the honour to state that I intend to make this recommendation to the Imperial Government, who will by then, I hope, have heard that New Zealand intends to act upon this basis."

We have had the advantage, which Mr. Stuart had not, of having before us as witnesses, persons who organized and persons who actually conducted the search which he here mentions, and also of hearing the evidence of those whose practical experience entitles them to discuss the conditions as to light and weather which may result in a searching plane missing a ship for which it is searching, although the ship gets a glimpse of the plane. In the result, we are satisfied that there is not the slightest warrant for the allegation made by Mr. Stuart.

According to the reports of the Naval authorities, Mr. Stuart asserted that the prisonors were treated shockingly unless they made concessions to their captors. In this, his reported statement is in conflict with the evidence of the witnesses we have seen and of the written statements of survivors. But, as to that, the account generally given of Mr. Stuart by his fellow-captives conveys an unfavourable impression as to his accuracy and reliability. His recorded statement gives no reasons for his conclusions. We have been quite unable to discover any evidence in support of those conclusions. We therefore reject them.

S.S. Komata

The Komata left Auckland at 11 p.m. on 26th November, 1940, calling at Suva 30th November to 2nd December, and thence to Nauru. She proceeded in accordance with Naval instructions (p. 402) received at Auckland, and arrived safely on Nauru on Friday, 6th December. On arrival at Nauru, Captain Fish reported by flag signal. At no time prior to encountering the raiders did he communicate with Nauru by wireless.

Between 1.30 p.m. that day and 5.30 a.m. on Sunday, the 8th, the Komata was lying off and on Nauru, and at the latter hour she commenced to steam towards the island at about half-speed. She was, at 8 a.m., some 25 miles to the eastward of it. Visibility at the time was poor, there being heavy rain squalls.

Captain Fish (p. 403) states that he first had reason to believe that suspicious vessels were in the vicinity at about 9 a.m., when the wireless operator reported to him details of signals made between Nauru and Ocean Island in reference to a distress call. A few minutes later the wireless operator reported that Nauru had sent out a general call for the Japanese ships in the vicinity to report their positions. Almost simultaneously the Chief Officer reported three ships in sight. Captain Fish went on the bridge and saw two ships on his starboard side not more than 1.5 miles distant, and one of them appeared to be Japanese. The order "Hard aport" was given to swing the Komata away from the ships, one of which turned to close the Komata with signals flying which, however, owing to heavy rain squalls, could not be immediately be distinguished. These signals were subsequently made out to be " Stop-do not use your wirclcss." Captain Fish immediately ordered the "suspicious vessel" signal to be sent out (p. 404). This signal was already coded, except for the ship's position, and the wireless operator (p. 809) commenced to send it. While doing so, he realized that the message was being jammed, and immediately started making the distress message.

It was about this time that the enemy opened fire, being not more than three-quarters of a mile away. One shell burst in the room immediately underneath the wireless-room and put the transmitter out of action. Another carried away the main aerial. The wireless operator, Ward, who appears to have discharged his duties in a commendable manner, endeavoured to repair the damage and to put the transmitter into operation again (pp. 810, 811). Meanwhile, Captain Fish (p. 405), seeing that the aerials had been shot away, the wireless-room damaged, and the Chief Officer killed, stopped the ship in order to save further loss of life. The shelling ceased, and he gave the order to abandon ship. The Komata was then boarded by the enemy. Subsequently, the crew of the Komata were allowed to return to their ship in order to obtain clothing.

We are satisfied from the evidence that some of the Komata's confidential documents which were in a weighted bag, were in fact thrown overboard prior to the ship being boarded. Other confidential matter which at the time was in the safe in the Captain's room, was, however, not destroyed and fell into the hands of the enemy. Captain Fish states (p. 409) that he gave the Chief Officer the safe keys with instructions to destroy these documents. The Chief Officer was killed and the keys lost before he could do so. There was only one set of keys. We feel bound to remark in this connection that two separate persons should have been in possession of a key to the safe containing confidential matter.

Captain Fish and six members of his crow were taken to the Manyo Maru, the remainder of the crew to the Tokio Maru.

Captain Fish, during his period of captivity, became convinced in his own mind that the raiders were in receipt of information regarding ships' movements, and that this information must be coming either from Australia or New Zealand. This conviction was based on the following things:

(1)The Prize Officer (Eggert) and, afterwards, the raider captain, told him they had not expected to find the Komata at Nauru, but had expected to meet her a week previously on her way to Suva (p. 410-413);

(2) A remark by Eggert, "There is only the Achilles in New Zealand and she can't get up there (to Nauru) and the other ship has gone south again" (pp. 414-417);

(3) What is described by Captain Fish as "the remarkable confidence displayed by the German captain in his movements." (pp. 415-417).

Captain Fish connected these things with an incident which occurred at Auckland in August, 1940, when, consequent upon the secret sailing times of five ships having become common knowledge on the Auckland waterfront, those orders were changed.

With reference to (1), Eggert's remark was made to Captain Fish on the latter's return to the Komata after abandoning ship, when he found Eggert and two German seamen engaged in a search of his room (p.410). Captain Fish thought it remarkable that Eggert should know that the Komata had called at Suva. In this connection Captain Fish agreed with the suggestion made to him by us that there was considerable evidence about the Komata decks of her call at Suva, in the shape of bananas and other tropical fruit; that this would certainly be observed by Eggert and his boarding party when searching the ship, and that they would realize that these things were unlikely to have been obtained elsewhere than at Suva. With this new thought now present in his mind, Captain Fish agreed that the deducing of a Suva visit by the Komata can have presented no difficulty to the boarding party and to the raider captain.

Now with reference to item No. (2) quoted above, Captain Fish recites the Prize Officer (Eggert) as having claimed in one sentence the possession of three pieces of knowledge, namely :-

(a) That the only warship then in New Zealand waters was the Achilles;

(b) That the Achilles was at that moment so far away that she could not get to Nauru in time to interfere;

The question for us is whether any one of these three statements proves that there had been leakage of information from New Zealand. Captain Fish thinks the conversation took place on 13th December. It is plain from the evidence that at the time they captured the Holmwood the Germans did not know the identity of the warship then in Lyttelton Harbour, and were extremely anxious to find out. As far as we know, the Achilles was, on 13th December, still the only warship in New Zealand waters; but there is nothing surprising in the Germans having now a knowledge of her identity which they did not possess on 26th November. In the meantime they had captured the Rangitane There may well have been many people on the Rangitane who knew that the Achilles had been at Lytttelton when the Rangitane left Auckland, and the Germans had, by this time, had ample opportunity for long conversations in German with the foreign men and women. The evidence also contains more than one suggestion that the Germans had the means of overhearing conversations between the captives themselves. Finally, no one can be sure that in the course of the many casual conversations with their captives which the Germans appear to have encouraged, they may not have picked up the information from some incautious remark.

As to the second item, so far as the evidence before us has gone, Eggert was right: the Achilles was then too far away. And, of course, the fact that he was right may have been due to leakage from New Zealand; but we certainly cannot accept the fact that he was right as proving that such leakage had occurred. The circumstances of the conversation must be considered. A subordinate German officer, Eggert, happens to mention to one of his captives, Captain Fish, that they are about to return to Nauru; Fish at once tells him that it is a reckless thing to do and that they may run into trouble. The natural reaction of the subordinate officer to this would immediately be to try to find out whether Captain Fish really knew something which it would be of great service for Eggert to ascertain in order that he might report it to his own commander. The approved method of drawing another man on those occasions is to make assertions in the dark in the hope that he will either contradict them or accept them; and, in our opinion, this remark may well have been of that nature. We cannot, therefore, accept the fact that it was made as proving that there had been leakage.

As to the third statement embodied in this one remark. Because of certain knowledge which Captain Fish had acquired from Commander Bingley as to the intended movements of the Monowai and certain further knowledge as to her actual movements which he had recently acquired at Suva, the Monowai was obviously very much in his mind at the time, and he immediately connected the remark with the Monowai, though it by no means follows that the Germans so intended. Even if the German did intend to indicate the Monowai there are many ways, quite apart from leakage from New Zealand, in which the Germans might have acquired by that time knowledge of where the Monowai had recently been. We do not accept that portion of the remark as proving leakage from New Zealand.

As to Item (3), we have already commented upon the air of omniscience which the raider captain was at pains to display before his captives. It was intended to impress them, and it appears to have been successful with Captain Fish.

M.V.VINNI

Coming now to the circumstances attending the loss of the Norwegian motor-vessel Vinni on 7th December. This ship sailed from Dunedin at 5 a.m. on 21st November, 1940, bound for Nauru under Naval instructions, and arrived off Nauru safely at 12.40 p.m. on 30th November, and for a week had been drifting in the vicinity of Nauru waiting for an opportunity to load.

We have been unable to obtain any evidence from survivors of this ship, none being available in New Zealand. We have, however, been supplied by the Australian authorities with a statements made in Australia by the Chief Officer of the ship, and also with a copy of a diary kept by this officer. From these documents the following narrative has been compiled:

On the afternoon of 7th December the Vinni had drifted about twenty miles from Nauru and then steamed up towards the Island and stopped about 5 miles to the westward. At about 6 p.m. another vessel was observed on the far aide of the Island, heading towards the western end. On rounding the western end of the Inland this vessel passed within 1 mile of the land and within sight of the signal station (statement by Chief Officer). The view of this vessel as she approached obtainable from the Vinni was complicated by the fact that there were intervening palm-trees, but when she was about 3 miles from the Vinni the Japanese markings on her hull became visible. The vessel continued to approach at high speed, which roused the Captain's suspicions, which he discussed with his Chief Officer on the bridge, saying that it seemed unlikely that any Japanese ship should visit Nauru. As, however, no signal had been made by the signal station, it was considered that the vessel must be friendly.

When approximately 1.5 miles from the Vinni the Japanese vessel signalled "Stop." The captain of the Vinni immediately turned away and ordered " Full speed." The raider again signalled "Stop," and followed this by "Do not use your wireless." By this time the raider was close to the Vinni, and the captain of the Vinni then obeyed these and all subsequent orders from the raider, including one to abandon ship.

A boarding party from the raider was sent to the Vinni bringing bombs with them. The crew of Vinni were allowed to take a limited amount of gear with them, and shortly after the crew of the Vinni arrived in the raider a series of explosions was hoard, and later the survivors were informed that the Vinni had sunk at about 10 p.m. (Nauru time). The Vinni was sunk by the Manyo Maru.

From the statements at our disposal it appears (Chief Officer's statement) that the captain of the raider knew that five ships were lying off Nauru; but that when he sighted the Vinni he thought she was the Storviken, which latter vessel was, in fact, expected at Nauru. Also in the evidence of Captain Miller (p. 58) and Captain Upton (p. 284) the captain of the raider announced the Vinni as being the Triadic.

We have no reason to suspect any leakage of information from New Zealand because of the raiders' knowledge of the number of ships at Nauru or even of their names, since the mails carried by the Triona appear to have been captured previously and the Schedule of Shipping for December was in this mail. Our authority for this is a copy of a Naval signal made on the 13th December, 1940, by the Resident at Ocean Island to the Staff Officer Intelligence, Wellington, which was put before us. There was considerable evidence before us that owing to weather and harbour difficulties considerable congregations of ships near Nauru occurred, from time to time, and that this fact was necessarily generally known. For the raiders to go to Nauru therefore proves nothing. That after they had captured the Triona they had knowledge of the identity of the ships they might find there may well be explained by the capture of mails, and what the mails contained.

NAURAU AND OCEAN ISLANDS

In dealing with the events at the above islands in so far as they bear on the loss of ships in the vicinity of Nauru, we have been careful to remember that Nauru is under the control of the Australian Government. Nevertheless, some portions of the evidence at our disposal do, in our opinion, bear on this matter, and may possibly be of value to the authorities in Australia.

The chronological sequence of events in this area, from our evidence, was as follows; Captain Miller (p. 61) states that the Triona was intercepted at about 5 p.m. on the 6th December. Also (p. 62) that in his opinion, although he at the time was not allowed on deck, the ship in which he was confined moved her engines only a few turns between 5.50 p.m. and some time after 9 p.m. During this period he considers it probable that the Triona was boarded and presumably searched. We have also been informed that the Triona did, in fact, have mails on board and that the Schedule of Shipping for the month of December was included in this mail and may well have been captured by the enemy. We have no evidence to show whether the Triona was or was not successful in sending any distress message.

The Vinni was intercepted at 6 p.m. on the 7th December and was sunk. Captain Upton (p. 307) states that, prior to the sinking of the Vinni, the raider in which he was a prisoner cruised during daylight on 7th December for some time at a distance of about 2.5 miles from Nauru. The Chief Officer of the Vinni stated that the raider in approaching to attack passed within 1 mile of the west point of the Island. The master of the Vinni was becoming anxious about the character of the approaching Japanese ship, and passed a remark to the Chief Officer, who replied, "As long as they do not make any signal from the Island, everything must be O.K." As a result, the master of the Vinni did not make any W/T signal. From the small amount of evidence available, the master of the Vinni appears to have had good reasons for not making a wireless signal. The behaviour of Nauru Island is inexplicable on the evidence received in New Zealand. This Island is in the Australian mandate, and presumably the Australian authorities areinvestigating this question.

On the morning of 8th December the Triadic, Triaster, and Komata were sunk. Commodore Parry states :

"As far as can be ascertained, the Triadic and Triaster also sent out wireless signals, which should have been picked up by Nauru and Ocean Islands. Even if they were jammed by the Germans, these two stations should have heard the jamming."

In his statement, made in Australia, however, Captain Callender of the Triadic states: "The second and third shots destroyed the wireless-cabin - the wireless operator being off duty at the time." From this it would appear that no wireless message was attempted by the Triadic.

From the evidence we have before us we are satisfied that the Komata did make her distress signal, although this was being jammed by the enemy.

From the evidence of the wireless operator of the Komata (p. 808) the station at Nauru called Ocean Island between 4 a.m. and 8 a.m. on the 8th December, asking whether Ocean Island had heard any signal of distress in the morning. Ocean Island replied and asked what time. Nauru could not tell them, but they answered to the effect that it was the British Phosphate Co. who had attended to the distress signal, whatever it was. Later in the morning watch, Nauru was heard asking Japanese vessels standing off Nauru to report.

From the above it would appear that Nauru became aware during the morning that Japanese ships were in the vicinity; but we have no evidence as to whether any action was taken in this matter. Nor have we any evidence as to whether the Komata's distress message, or the jamming by the enemy, was heard at Nauru.

As to some of the claims to be in possession of secret information which the Germans are reported to have made, our opinion, as we have already expressed, is that, in truth, they did not possess such information. Further, after weighing all the evidence that has become available to us, we do not find it established by the evidence that there have been any leakages, either directly or indirectly, from New Zealand of information relating to the movement of ships. But we do not think it right to leave the matter there. To establish the proposition that there have been no such leakages would be a difficult, if not an impossible, matter. We are bound to make it clear that the evidence does not establish that no such leakages have taken place. On the contrary, a good deal of evidence has come before us which suggests that it would not at any time be surprising to obtain positive proof that leakage of information from Now Zealand as to the movements of shipping has occurred, although no such positive proof has, in our opinion, come before us in the course of this inquiry. The nearest approach to such positive proof of leakage from Now Zealand which we have observed is in connection with the uncodcd wireless messages between New Zealand and the Chathams in November, 1940.

We now summarise our reasons for saying that it would not be surprising if it were shown hereafter that leakages from New Zealand of information as to the movements of shipping had occurred or were occurring. For such a thing to happen intentionally and to our disadvantage, two conditions must concur. First, it would be necessary for an enemy agent or sympathizer in New Zealand to obtain information as to the movements of shipping which would be of value to the enemy. Secondly, it would he necessary for him to find means of transmitting such information to the enemy in sufficient time for the information to be useful. Upon the evidence, we are of opinion that, though compliance with these conditions would present certain difficulties, in neither case are the difficulties insuperable.

First, as to the acquisition of information in New Zealand. Upon the outbreak of war it was determined by the authorities that, consequent upon the position in the Pacific, it would, upon this occasion, be necessary to shroud the movements of our shipping in the utmost secrecy obtainable. The evidence compels us to conclude that there are large sections of the community which have never appreciated the wisdom of this decision, that it has never received their active support and co-operation, but, on the contrary, that it has been hindered and frustrated by a great deal of very unintelligent and selfish indiscretion. We quote the following examples:

Mr. McNamara, the Controller of Censorship, informed us at p. 670 of his evidence that, in censoring air-mail, it has been found that the New Zealand public have been indiscreet to a remarkable degree in mentioning the movements of ships. He said:

"It is not peculiar to New Zealand. The censorship authorities in Australia in their reports tell us that the same thing happens there. They cannot understand why the public are continually writing about ships and the like and troops going away. It is very bad in New Zealand particularly. I do not think it is anything but indiscretion. People will tell the men overseas everything that happens. When we had the big fleet in here and the warships leaving about five months ago, I know that not only were the names of the warships given, but particulars of their armament. The names of every vessel convoying the troops were given, and where they were to lie in the convoy."

Mr. McNamara added that the Prime Minister made a public statement about this kind of thing, but that no improvement was observed in the behaviour of air-mail correspondents. At p. 862 of his evidence Mr. McNamara gave further instances. He mentioned that in one week fifty-nine cables emanating from Auckland had to be amended to conceal the movements and location of troop, Naval, and Air Force units, and that in the same week fifty-nine cables emanating from Wellington had to be amended for the same reason; that in the same period three radio messages from Wellington had to be altered to conceal routes of ships, and in that same week six cable messages from Auckland and four from Wellington were cancelled because they gave information about troop movements. He says that this kind of thing is going on all the time.

It can readily be understood that this species of stupidity on the part of the public is very disheartening. Apparently none of these rash correspondents has ever envisaged the possibility of our air-mail falling into the hands of the enemy. It should be a thought ever present to every one that anything committed to transit by sea, air, cable, or radio may suffer that fate. As it is, the energies of a large body of censors, which ought to be available for some useful form of war work, such as tracking down an enemy agent, are consumed in the task of protecting this country from the consequences of the folly of its own citizens. This task is thankless, never-ending, and should be entirely unnecessary.

Mr. McNamnra also says, at p. 685, that the shipping companies in their cables, telegrams, and mail correspondence frequently mention matters which should not be mentioned. He added that the difficulty of controlling this kind of thing was increased by the fact that uncoded cables which freely indicated the projected movements of shipping were constantly arriving from Australia. A file of recent cables from Australia to the Internal Marketing Department, which confirms and exemplifies this portion of Mr. McNamara's evidence, was put before us by the Solicitor-General, who had received it on loan from the Navy Office, Wellington. The matter is apparently under discussion between the Dominion and the Commonwealth authorities. It is to be hoped that a solution will be reached which assists the authorities here in enforcing more careful behaviour by shipping offices in New Zealand.

Some evidence which we took in Auckland, recorded at pp. 446-454, suggests that there is room for much tightening up in the matter of the information as to probable sailing dates given to intending passengers. It is true that they are not told the actual sailing date. But the practices followed, in our opinion, unable them to make an accurate prediction of the date. Of course, they talk about this, and so it becomes public property. If an enemy agent or sympathizer is interested in the information, it would be easy for him to obtain it. Consideration for the safety of shipping, and incidentally of persons about to travel by sea, must, in our opinion, override the mere convenience of persons about to travel.

We are satisfied that indiscreet talk about intended or expected shipping movements is deplorably common. A particularly bad example will be found recorded at pp. 490 to 498 of the evidence. This records two men who should have known better gossiping about certain intended shipping movements and movements of troops in most unsuitable places and at a time when the particular intended movements were still very secret, and it was important that they should remain secret. The matter is now stale, and no harm, in fact, came of it. But it was all highly dangerous and deplorable. And the most disturbing circumstance is that, inasmuch as the information proved to be completely correct, the incident points to a serious breach of confidence by some undiscovered person who was entrusted with or improperly became possessed of confidential information. Unfortunately, we were unable to carry this matter further because the originator of this reprehensible gossip assured us on oath that after the most earnest efforts he had been unable to recall from whom he had obtained his information. He acted very wrongly in repeating it, as does every one who seeks to pry into matters upon which, for the national safety, it has been determined that secrecy should be observed, or who repeats, circulates, or even listens to alleged information or surmises upon such topics. We fear that there is not, as yet, any public conscience upon this matter, and that, on the contrary, it is considered clever to know anything about matters which the authorities are trying to keep secret.

Another example of surprising thoughtlessness is recorded at pp. 841, 842, and 847, where it appears that a responsible officer of the Marketing Department, who is required by the nature of his duties to have in his possession written particulars of a very secret nature of the future movements of shipping, had the habit of walking out of his room at lunch-time leaving the documents lying on his table in his unlocked, empty room, to which any member of the public might easily obtain access.

It further appears that there is really no reason why these secret particulars should not be concealed by a system of code; but it is only at this stage of the war that this question is receiving attention. This and allied topics are mentioned in the evidence of several witnesses. We refer to the evidence of a member of the Overseas Shipowners' Allotment Committee, which commences at p. 822, the evidence of an officer of the Marketing Department, which commences at p. 838, the evidence of a member of the New Zealand Woolbuycrs' Association, which commences at p. 968, the evidence of the General Manager of the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board, which commences at p. 1017, and the evidence of another officer of the Marketing Department, which commences at p. 1021. From all this evidence we collect the impression that there has been unnecessary publicity as to intended movements of shipping. Three criticisms, in our opinion, may fairly be made, viz :

(1) A system of code to assist in concealing dates and names seems feasible, but is only now under consideration;

(2) More information has been going out to some interested parties than they really required to have;

(3) Information has been given to some interested parties before they really required to have it.

It is impossible, we think, to lay down rigid rules either as to the quantity of information that may be given or the stage at which information should be given. But, in our opinion, the guiding principles ought to be that no one is ever to know anything connected with intended shipping movements unless it is absolutely necessary that he should know it, nor should he ever know it any earlier than is absolutely necessary. Finally, as to what constitutes absolutely necessity, a considerable amount of business inconvenience must be cheerfully suffered in wartime in the interests of national safety. We do not think the problems which arise have hitherto been approached upon that basis.

Another example is recorded at pp. 817 et seq., from which it appears that after nearly eighteen months of war the practice of chalking the names of overseas vessels on railway trucks destined to receive their contents had been continued in the Railway Department. It had never occurred to any official to ask his superiors whether this was a desirable practice in wartime. Whien it was determined recently to discontinue it, it never seems to have occurred to any one that the mention of the ship's name on the destination card on the back of the truck should be abolished as well as the chalking on the side. This kind of incident suggests that all peacetime habits are continued unquestioningly, unless some one in authority positively prohibits them. The proper attitude would be for every one whose work is in any way concerned with the movements of shipping to examine anxiously whether the continuation of any peacetime practice in which he is concerned is consistent with the maintenance of that secrecy which Government desires as to shipping. If there is any doubt about the matter, the attention of superiors should at once be directed to it by their subordinates.

It is obvious that the wharves are places where information as to intended shipping movements and cargoes may be gleaned. They are also places where sabotage might be committed, and in wartime access to wharves must also be considered from the point of view that ships may be used as a means of transmitting messages abroad by other than open and official channels.

From all three points of view access to the wharves is a matter which must be carefully supervised in wartime. The evidence describes what has been done in Wellington and Auckland. We have no criticism to make as to the Auckland supervision as described in pp. 1088 et seq. and 1098 et seq. of the evidence, except the general comment that some form of water police or harbour patrol appears to us desirable, but has not yet been arranged. The control of the Wellington wharves, as it existed up to March, 1941, is described at pp. 1031 et seq. and 1048 et seq. of the evidence. In our opinion, it was unsatisfactory in the following respects:

(1) There were too few police for the work to be done;

(2) In various ways it was possible for an unauthorized and possibly undesirable person to get on to the wharves without producing any pass or other written authority;

(3) We cannot accept the suggestion that the dangers arising from this would be neutralized by expecting individual policemen to challenge all persons whose faces were unknown to them. We do not think that would happen.

We make no further detailed comments, because it will be observed from pp. 1220 to 1240 of the evidence that we were informed by the Commissioner of Police that immediately after the evidence given before us on 4th March the control of the Wellington wharves was tightened up (see pp. 1228 and 1220). We recognized that, because of the geography of the Wellington wharves, adequate control presents ccrtain difficulties. We suggest that unless the additional numbers of police who are requisite arepromptly obtainable, the alternative of handing over to the military the guarding of the unfenced portion, including the Floating Dock and Aotea Wharf, might usefully be considered. It appeared from p. 1229 of the evidence that even after the tightening-up of control difficulty was being raised about requiring every person, including watersiders and Harbour Board employees, as he enters the wharf, to produce some form of pass or authority. We believe this could be arranged as not to occasion any unreasonable delay to workers. Until it is arranged, the entry of persons who have no business on the wharves may be facilitated. It is not, in our opinion, an answer to point out that no system of passes is an absolute precaution.

The remarks made earlier as to water police apply also in Wellington. As to what the Commissioner hopes to do in this matter, we refer to his evidence at pp. 1238 et seq.

It necessarily happens that both the Navy and the Army are in possession of early information as to intended movements of troops by sea. In each case the systems adopted for preserving secrecy were described to us in evidence, and appear to us carefully thought out and satisfactory. Great care is taken to confine secret information to as few persons as possible. In the Army it necessarily happens that subordinate officers, and ultimately all ranks, are in a position to make guesses which may sometimes happen to be almost correct. The work of many other persons enables them to make similar guesses. For the troops themselves to make surmizes as to the dates of their own departure is a manifestation of a natural human weakness, very difficult to suppress. But it is not an example of good citizenship. Still less is the repetition and circulation of such surmizes by persons less directly interested.

Questions have been raised by some of our correspondents as to the reliability and discretion of the many clerical assistants, male and female, who are taken into the offices of the Services in wartime. The Public Service Commissioner gave evidence as to this. We are satisfied that if it is made clear to him that a clerk or typist is required for work in which he or she will have to handle really secret information, he and his assistants realize their responsibility, and endeavour to supply a person of unquestionable loyalty who has had training in keeping secrets and has proved that he or she has learned to do so. We agree with the expressed opinion of the Public Service Commissioner that no officer in the Services or in any Government Department should over entrust secret work to a clerk or typist who is not in that category, and, if an assistant of that character is required, that it should be made clear in the application for such assistance.

We say no more in support of our view that the national habits facilitate the acquisition by an enemy agent of knowledge of intended shipping movements. We come now to the second question, which is whether such knowledge, when acquired, could be passed to the enemy in time to be of use to him.

A great deal of evidence was taken as to the possibility of the existence in New Zealand of illicit and undetected wireless-transmitting apparatus, and the possibility of its use so as to assist the enemy. It is not in the public interest to risk telling the enemy exactly what precautions have been taken and are being taken in this connection. But it should be recorded that it has been shown to us that the authorities have been, for a long time, alive to this possibility. It should also be generally understood that such transmission might happen despite vigilance by the authorities and despite well-directed technical knowledge; and that, the general consensus of the expert opinions which we had the advantage of hearing is that the possibility of such a misuse of wireless from New Zealand cannot be dismissed merely because no such thing has yet been detected.

With regard to diathermy apparatus, the position is explained by the following quotation from the evidence of Mr. Steel of the Post and Telegraph Department:

" Diathermy: that is also covered in those regulations. Diathermy apparatus is actually a small wireless transmitter. It differs very little from an ordinary transmitter that we would use at our stations in that it has no aerial, thc energy instead of being fed into an aerial to start the waves is fed into thc body. We followed British practice in this respect. With very little trouble any of those diathermy apparatus could be used for transmitting messages, and, furthermore, there are a large number of these machines in the possession of enemy aliens in New Zealand. They are of German manufacture a lot of them, and refugee doctors and dentists have them. To get over the danger from these machines we have licensed every diathermy machine in New Zealand (something like 300-odd); even if they are held by hospitals or doctors of any sort they must have a license. No enemy alien is allowed to be licensed. That meant quite a little hardship on some of those men. We have had to insist on their giving up their apparatus or we have given them the option (and this was on the recommendation of the Health Department) that if they could obtain a British person to take charge of the apparatus and have sole control over it, they could operate it, but the enemy alien could diagnose cases of his patients and send them along to be given treatment on the machine, but, the alien was to have no access to, or control of, the machine. Several have availed themselves of that concession, but we have had to take their apparatus from others.''

Another rapid means of communication with the enemy which might conceivably be misused is the ordinary commercial cable, which might convey information by means of a pre-arranged code. We are satisfied that this possibility is also thoroughly understood, and that steps aimed at preventing it are taken. But, in this connection we refer to the evidence at pp. 513, 514, 676, 677, and pp. 917-20. If these passages are compared it will, we think, be seen that they indicate a certain lack of co-ordination There appears to have been in the possession of one Department some recorded information of a kind which might, at times, be useful to another Department, to which the information had not been passed. In a report which it may be desired to publish, we must be content to refer to the topic in this way, lest we convey a warning to the enemy.

It is evident that a large number of the public fear that information may be conveyed to the enemy through the medium of our broadcasting services. It has been suggested that certain methods might be used to broadcast a pre-arranged code e.g., announcements over the air of missing cars, with numbers and descriptions thereof, of missing relatives, of children's and other birthday greetings, of advertisements, and of the rendering of certain musical items. We have had before us Professor Shelley, of the National Broadcasting Service, and Mr. L. J. Greenberg, Secretary and Superintendent of Staff of the National Commercial Broadcasting Service. They have satisfied us that announcements of missing cars or missing relatives are forbidden unless they come from the police. As to birthday and other like announcements, these ceased to be made by some of the commercial stations on the 23rd January, 1941, and by the remainder on 3rd March, 1941. The question of their discontinuance is under consideration by the national stations. Professor Shelley himself agrees that they should be discontinued (Evidence, p. 933), and so do we. The evidence is that the script of all advertisements is altered before the advertisement goes over the air; that the strictest supervision is exercised over all musical items, and the method of announcing them; and that even the jokes made in the sponsored feature "Chuckles with Jerry" are censored before being projected over the air; and that as to all matters there is a time-lag, and that the person who evolves the phraseology is not the person to determine when it will be broadcast. As to musical numbers, we are satisfied that the programmes are built round an advertising unit so far ahead that it is impossible for any announcer to put on a record, such, for instance, as one which would indicate the presence of warships in any of our harbours without prior notification.

Furthermore, the script of all projected broadcasts is censored, and now most of them are recorded some time before they are put over so that the speaker himself does not know when his record will be on the air.

The bona fides of every member of the staffs has been checked. The microphones are adequately safeguarded and there is practically no chance of any unauthorized person getting access to any of them. All stations; have now ceased making weather reports, except when instructed by the Meteorological Department to give warnings of approaching storms.

The result of the evidence is to satisfy us that both the national and the commercial services are aware of the dangers of misuse of broadcasting, and have been at pains to evolve careful systems, which, if faithfully administered by their staffs, should make any such misuse impossible.

Many of the communications received by us from members of the public related to aliens. This interest in aliens obviously proceeds upon the assumption that information of use to the enemy can be procured in New Zealand, and can be sent out of New Zealand. We think both assumptions are justified. That being so, it follows that the interest which the public manifests in aliens is natural and justified. What has been done, and is being done, about aliens was therefore a question upon which we were bound to inform ourselves. It was not thought proper to acquire this information merely by means of the circumstance that the Chairman of this Commission also happens to be the Chairman of the Aliens Appeal Tribunal. As appears from pp. 955 et. seq. of the evidence, Mr. Dallard, the Under-Secretary for Justice, who has acted as Executive Officer in the administration of Aliens Control, attended before us and gave evidence. He also produced the regulations and the printed instructions issued by the Minister for the guidance of authorities.

It appears that all aliens, not merely enemy aliens, are compelled to register with the police. The number of aliens who are of German or Italian nationality, and therefore rank as "enemy aliens," is some 2,300. This figure includes a number of young persons, because all persons over sixteen years of age must register. It also includes all women, including women of British nationality who acquired German or Italian nationality by marriage. It also includes refugees, because a Jewish or political refugee does not, according to international law, lose his enemy nationality merely because he dislikes, has suffered under, or escaped from the present German far Italian Government. Arrangements were made for the systematic investigation of the whole of this body of 2,300 persons. It was conducted in this manner: In each of the fifteen police districts responsible police officers, specially detailed for the work, prepared as to each "enemy alien" in his district a comprehensive police file which contained every complaint or suspicion as to the particular enemy alien which had in any way come to the knowledge of the police, and the results of the investigation thereof. It also contained a very full biography of the alien compiled as the result of a carefully prepared questionnaire, directed to the disclosure of full information upon all topics of which a knowledge would be helpful towards thorough understanding of the probable sympathies and capacities of the particular alien. This file, when complete, was placed before the local Aliens Authority, who, wherever he desired it or it was thought helpful, could also have made available to him the immigration file relating to the same alien. The immigration file was often useful because it disclosed just when the alien had first attempted to obtain a permit to enter New Zealand, what account of himself and his circumstances he then gave, by whom he was assisted to escape from the Continent, and what he was able to do about bringing money with him. The Aliens Authorities before whom such material was placed were in two districts Stipendiary Magistrates, and in all other cases experienced barristers. For the Wellington Police District the members of the Aliens Appeal Tribunal, in their individual capacities, acted as the authorities; and towards the end of their work were assisted by Mr. G. P. Finlay, an Auckland barrister, who had also been one of the Auckland authorities. The decisions of individual authorities were made subject to review by the Aliens Appeal Tribunal at the instance of either the alien or the police. The duty of an Alien Authority was to master the documentary material submitted to him, and to have the individual alien personally before him. In many instances quite a number of other witnesses were heard by the Authority, and many such witnesses were cross-examined by the officer representing the police and by counsel, if any, for the alien. The Authorities were directed by the Minister that it was not for the State to establish that it was necessary for an enemy alien to be interned; it was for the enemy alien to satisfy the authority that he was fit to be at large. The investigation of the whole 2,300 is now almost complete. In no case where internment has been recommended has the Minister declined to give effect to such recommendation. The duty entrusted to the authorities has not been confined to recommending immediate internment. They are directed to classify the aliens who come before them and to decide whether such persons are to be classified:

(a) For immediate internment;

(b) For internment in the event of hostilities coming to this country;